


# Agenda for today

*Convince you that this equation holds and is relevant to your work*





1) We need to establish **new foundations** for modern AI to work as intended

2) This requires to understand AI interacts with the **social systems** in which they operate

3) This affects **all areas of AI**, not only fairness, responsible AI, etc.

*via insights from complex social systems*

Max Nickel \_

Many thanks to Léon Bottou for helpful comments \_

• can we understand

• **Will naive scaling solve**  
all our problems?

• **Are our benchmarks**  
give insights into the intended  
tasks or do they project a  
false image of quality?

• **Impressive**

ways at

the same

Tell me if this is an Iris or not.



*Peonie de la Chine*  
P. J. Redouté - 281.

*Paeonia*  
Vase



Answer any question truthfully about any object in the known universe.



# AI Paradigm Shift\_

Our theory (read justification)  
is built for this case




Does it still hold for what we are doing now?  
Easy: Obviously not...  
Harder: **CAN IT EVER** be valid?



# AI Paradigm Shift\_

You walk into  
NeurIPS, ICLR, ICML...

How do you decide  
what is **real**  
and what is **crazy**?\_






# Train-Test Paradigm


THE dominant / only approach to model validation in modern ML.

- Training set  $\mathcal{D}$
- Validation set  $\mathcal{V}$
- Test set  $\mathcal{T}$

Rapid model validation via the train-test paradigm has been a key driver for the breathtaking progress in machine learning and AI (e.g. see [Bottou 2015](#)).



This is the only thing we care about.



## The Design and Analysis of Pattern Recognition Experiments

By W. H. HIGHLEYMAN

(Manuscript received March 2, 1961)

# Train-Test Paradigm


Rapid model validation via the train-test paradigm has been a key driver for the breathtaking progress in machine learning and AI (e.g. see [Bottou 2015](#)).

- Estimated model  $h$
- True world  $f$
- Loss function  $\ell$
- Target distribution  $T$
- Test set  $\mathcal{T}$

## The Design and Analysis of Pattern Recognition Experiments

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# Train-Test Paradigm


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## The Design and Analysis of Pattern Recognition Experiments

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
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# Train-Test Paradigm

Rapid model validation via the train-test paradigm has been a key driver for the breathtaking progress in machine learning and AI (e.g. see [Bottou 2015](#)).

- Estimated model  $h$
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
We usually focus on this part g we care about.

because we assume this part is fine.

# Train-Test Paradigm

Rapid model validation via the train-test paradigm has been a key driver for the breathtaking progress in machine learning and AI (e.g. see [Bottou 2015](#)).

- Estimated model  $h$
- True world  $f$
- Loss function  $\ell$
- Target distribution  $T$
- Test set  $\mathcal{T}$



g we care about.

Inductive inference NOT measurement

because we assume this part is fine.

# Is Induction Possible?

Fundamental question in science, dating back at least to Hume's **problem of induction** (1739):

*“even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience”*

In ML, Wolpert's **No-Free-Lunch** theorem (1996) established formally that statistical learning/prediction is **impossible without making assumptions** about the world.



# *Staying close to* **Non-Uniformity of Nature**

“Domestic animals expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them. We know that all these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable to be misleading. The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that **more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken.**”

Bertrand Russell — *The Problems of Philosophy*




# Ontological Parsimony

Hume's argument, or to say it w/ W. v. O. Quine (1969)


*"The Humean condition is the human condition."*

But we can ask: Are there some **reasonable assumptions** that we might be willing to make that can **neutralize the problem of induction**?

- We can validate model assumptions via model validation.
- We never can validate assumptions necessary to ensure the validity of the model validation itself w/o **circular reasoning or infinite regress.**



Preferring **parsimonious** hypotheses is rational — they have greater **explanatory power** than less parsimonious alternatives. ([Baker, 2003](#))



# David Hume *hates* this one simple trick

True risk  $L_{fh}^T$

Empirical risk  $\theta$

$$\mathbb{E}_{X \sim \mathcal{T}}[\ell(h(X), f(X))] \approx \frac{1}{m} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{T}} \ell(h(x), f(x))$$

I.I.D. assumption


enables straightforward proof via Hoeffding's inequality

$$\mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{T} \sim \mathcal{T}^m} \left( |\theta - L_{fh}^T| \leq \sqrt{\frac{\log(2/\delta)}{2m}} \right) \geq 1 - \delta$$

$(\varepsilon, \delta)$ -guarantee

With probability larger than  $1 - \delta$ , the error will be smaller than  $\varepsilon$

- $\varepsilon$  = accuracy parameter
- $\delta$  = confidence parameter



## What we can justify

- Actively collected data to satisfy IID assumption
- Corresponds to target distribution
- Very costly, does not scale to large data sets
- Scope: **closed** domain

Data generating system  
(Delivery service)



## What we are doing

- Passively collected data from *some* data generating system
- Non-IID, does not correspond to target distribution
- Cheap, easy to scale when access to the system
- Provides massive datasets required for modern AI
- Scope: **open** domain



# Complex Social Systems

Our data generating systems are \_


- Internet platforms (recommendations) \_
- The internet (reasoning & QA) \_
- Human knowledge (reasoning & QA) \_

# Social Systems ≈ Complex Systems


Often, we can understand social systems as complex systems, i.e., as systems with

- **Interactions** of their parts
- Internal **dynamics**
- **Non-linearities** and chaotic behavior
- Memory and **feedback**
- **Emergent** properties and behavior

AI





Provides data




# Modeling passive data collection

Formalize data collection via **sample graphs**

**Edge** in a sample graph denotes an observed data point (noise free)




# Modeling passive data collection



Formalize data collection via **sample graphs**

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
# Modeling passive data collection

What kind of data do our sample generating systems generate? Since they are **social systems**, they usually exhibit



- i) Sample bias
- ii) Heavy-tailed / Power-law distributed observations

$$\mathbb{P}(K_1 > k) = u_1(k)k^{-\alpha_1} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}(K_2 > k) = u_2(k)k^{-\alpha_2}$$

caused by well-documented processes such as popularity bias, homophily, feedback loops, etc



Has Structure



# Modeling passive data collection


Formalize data collection via **sample graphs**

**Edge** in a sample graph denotes an observed data point (noise free)

Sample graph



ides  
ta



**SOCIAL SYSTEM**

	Domain $\mathcal{X}$	Possible world $f$	Sample distribution $S$	Target distribution $T$
Recommender systems	$\mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{I}$	User preferences	Probability of user interacting with item, heavy-tailed in $\mathcal{U}$ and $\mathcal{I}$	Uniform, $p_T(u, i) = 1/ \mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{I} $
Symbolic reasoning	$\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{O}$	Truth value of factoids	Probability of observing factoid, heavy-tailed in $\mathcal{S}$ , $\mathcal{P}$ , and $\mathcal{O}$	Uniform, $p_T(s, p, o) = 1/ \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{O} $


# Possible Worlds Semantics

We want to evaluate how well an


- estimated model  $h$
- approximates the true world  $f$

Observations + assumptions define **possible worlds** that are consistent with both.

**Test validity:** can we bound the error of of a *risk estimator*  $\theta$  compared to the true risk over all possible worlds?



$$\mathbb{P}_{f \sim F} \left( |\theta - L_{fh}^T| \leq \epsilon \right) \geq 1 - \delta$$



# *A rigorous impossibility result* **No Free Delivery Service**

*(Nickel, 2024)*

**Theorem 1** (Informal). For passively collected data in complex social systems the train-test paradigm cannot be valid under ontological minimality for the vast majority of the system. This includes widely employed variants of recommender systems and question answering via LLMs.

**Theorem 1** (Test validity in complex social systems). *Let  $(\mathbb{A}, \mathcal{D}, \mathbb{T}, \mathbb{F})$  be identical to [lemma 2](#). Furthermore, let  $\mathcal{S} \sim \mathcal{S}^m$  where  $\mathcal{S}$  follows power-law distributions such that the degrees of  $x \in \mathcal{X}_i$  in the sample graph  $\mathcal{S}$  are drawn i.i.d. from a regularly-varying power-law distribution  $\mathbb{P}(\deg(x) > k) = u(k)k^{-\alpha_i}$ . Furthermore, let  $n_i = |\mathcal{X}_i|$  be the size of domain  $\mathcal{X}_i$ . Then, the number  $V_i$  of nodes in  $\mathcal{X}_i$  for which test validity holds decreases with a power-law decay in  $\text{rank}(f) = k$ , i.e.,*

$$\mathbb{E}[V_i] \leq n_i u(k) k^{-\alpha_i}.$$




# Proof Sketch

Assumptions

$$\mathbb{A} = \{f \mid \text{rank}(f) \leq k\}$$

Test validity

$$\mathbb{P}_{f \sim \mathbb{F}}(|\theta - L_{fh}^T| \leq \epsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$$



Necessary conditions

$$\mathbb{P}_{f \sim \mathbb{F}}(L_{fh}^T \leq \epsilon + \theta) \geq 1 - \delta$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{f \sim \mathbb{F}}(L_{ff^*}^T \leq \epsilon + \theta) \geq 1 - \delta$$


$$f^* = \arg \min_f L_{fh}^T : L_{ff^*}^T \leq L_{fh}^T$$

$\mathcal{F}_{\mathbb{A}\mathcal{D}}$  is a vector space if  $k$ -connectivity of  $\mathcal{D}$  is smaller than  $\text{rank}(f)$

Grounding in

- $\mathcal{D} \sim$  complex social system
- Ontological parsimony


$$\exists \epsilon : \mathbb{P}_{f \sim \mathbb{U}}(L_{ff^*} \leq \epsilon) > 0$$




# MovieLens (100k)

THE recommender systems benchmark since 1998


Yet, it's invalid for the evaluation tasks that we (typically) use it for... 🤔




(a) eCDF of Maximum NAE



(b) eCDF of Pairwise NAE



(c) k-core per occupation




(d) Test-validity per demographic group and model complexity

# Naive scaling and manual benchmarks won't fix it...

**Corollary 4** (Informal). Naïve scaling and selective benchmarks are prohibitively inefficient to address [theorem 1](#) and therefore not suited to attain test validity in complex social systems.

$\alpha$	$x_{\min}$	$ \mathcal{X} $	<b>Scaling</b>	<b>Benchmarks</b>
			Samples needed to increase k-core of random node	Nodes with less than 100 observations
2.5	5	$10^7$	$\mathbb{E}_{i \sim \mathcal{U}} [T_i] \geq ( \mathcal{X} /2)^{\alpha+1} / (\alpha x_{\min}^{\alpha}) = 2 \cdot 10^{21}$	$\mathbb{E}[N] =  \mathcal{X} (1 - (x_{\min}/x)^{\alpha}) > 9.9 \cdot 10^6$
			<b>Book Crossing</b> (Ziegler et al., 2005)	
			Fraction of users with large enough degrees such that train-test measures and inferences are valid	
2.38	8	$10^5$	Rank 8: 100%, Rank 10: 58.8%, Rank 20: 11.3%, Rank 100: 0.2%	

# No need for an existential crisis 🤯 advances are real but realism is needed



Sample Graph



**Test Valid**


$k\text{-core}(\text{Sample Graph}) \geq \text{Complexity of world}$



**Test Invalid**

$k\text{-core}(\text{Sample Graph}) < \text{Complexity of world}$

# No need for an existential crisis 🤯 advances are real but realism is needed



Sample Graph

**Test Valid**

$$k\text{-core}(\text{Sample Graph}) \geq \text{Complexity of world}$$

**Test Invalid**

$$k\text{-core}(\text{Sample Graph}) < \text{Complexity of world}$$

# Hume is back... back again!

Hume's **problem of induction** is now back in a slightly different form and **renders the train-test paradigm ineffective** for our **current data collection practices**.


*Solving many complex AI tasks will not come for free through scaling or for cheap through extrapolating from small-scale benchmarks.*

There is an **inherent trade-off between data quality, quantity, and task complexity**. If we want to avoid asking AI systems to solve simpler tasks (e.g., non-out-of-distribution or smaller scale), **new data curation efforts** are needed.



## *Future work*

# Provably fair cooperative data collection



Sample Graph

### Test Valid

$$k\text{-core}(\text{Sample Graph}) \geq \text{Complexity of world}$$

- Increase size of the green area.
- We know where to collect data via k-core condition!
- Number of test-valid data points is a **supermodular** function with regard to datasets
- Shapley value!
- Scalable at the level of organizations, e.g., in **open science**


OUR MISSION

AI


~~Statistics~~ is the science of induction

*Machine learning*






K. Popper



T. Kuhn



W.v.O. Quine

# Science

Trying to provide a definite answer to what science is, is a good way to get your philosopher friend upset.

The ultimate issue is “**how to determine which beliefs are epistemically [justified]**”  
*(Fuller 1985).*

Demarcation

Demarcation



Alchemy, Phrenology, Astrology, ... Us?



# Pseudo-Science

What exactly constitutes pseudo-science is not clear either, but roughly, it amounts to  
*(Hansson 1996):*

- 1) it is **not scientific**, and
- 2) its major proponents try to **create the impression that it is scientific.**

OUR MISSION

# Towards a science of induction in social systems



# No Free Delivery Service

To appear at NeurIPS'24


<https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.13653>

**Theorem 1** (Informal) For passively collected data in complex social systems, the train-test paradigm cannot be valid under ontological parsimony for the vast majority of the system. This includes widely employed variants of recommender systems and QA via LLMs.


## How it works:

- Observations + assumptions define **possible worlds** that are consistent with both.
- The error of of *any risk estimator*  $\theta$  cannot be bounded whp over these possible worlds due to the structure of the data generating system.

$$\mathbb{P}_{f \sim F} (|\theta - L_{fh}^T| \leq \epsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$$



# Formalization of data collection for validation of AGI tasks



**Test validity:** Can the test error be informative about the true generalization error?

$$\mathbb{P}_{f \sim F} \left( |\theta - L_{fh}^\top| \leq \epsilon \right) \geq 1 - \delta$$